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ACTUAL INNOCENCE AND MANIFEST INJUSTICE 
LARRY MAY AND NANCY VINER* 
‘“Are you suggesting . . . [that] even if we find Mr. Amrine is actually 
innocent,  he should be executed?’ [questioned Judge Laura Denvir Stith of the 
Missouri Supreme Court].  Frank A. Jung, an assistant state attorney general, 
replied, ‘That’s correct, your honor.’”1 
“Augustine declares that God himself would be unjust if he should condemn an 
innocent man.”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most disturbing aspects of the contemporary death penalty 
jurisprudence in the United States is the reluctance of courts to examine claims 
of actual innocence of those who are scheduled for execution.  To the person 
on the street, the assumption is that those who are executed are those who are 
clearly guilty.  Yet, as was seen in Illinois in the last few years, it has turned 
out that many people on death row do not deserve to be there because they did 
not commit the acts for which they were convicted and sentenced to death.  
The probability that there will be people executed who are innocent is what 
caused former Illinois Governor George Ryan to commute the sentences of all 
of those on death row as he left office.  Furthermore, the Missouri Supreme 
Court has recently overturned the capital conviction of Joseph Amrine, holding 
that the continued incarceration, and threat of death, of a person who is 
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 1. Adam Liptak, Prosecutors See Limits to Doubt In Capital Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 
2003, at A1. 
 2. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 539 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 
Oxford University Press 1925) (1625). 
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actually innocent is a “manifest injustice.”3  In this article, we will defend the 
main argument advanced in the Amrine decision, namely, that denying actual 
innocence claims is a paradigmatic example of manifest injustice and a denial 
of substantive due process. 
It may seem odd to those who do not know this debate that there is even a 
controversy here.  Surely, on common-sense grounds it is odd that anyone 
would argue in favor of executing the innocent, as seems to have been the 
position of the Attorney General of Missouri in the Amrine case.  To motivate 
consideration of this issue, it is important first to note that the term “legally 
innocent” could merely be a technical term for someone who has not been 
convicted by a court of law.  Used in this way, there are no cases of “actual 
innocence” on appeal because either one has indeed been convicted in which 
case one is not now innocent, or one has not been convicted, in which case one 
is indeed innocent, but then one is not in need of appeal because one would not 
be on death row.  If a person is “legally innocent,” in this technical sense, then 
no one would argue that this person should be executed.  But the controversy 
concerns what is sometimes called “factual innocence,” roughly synonymous 
for “did not commit the act that one is accused of having committed.”  There is 
a way to make sense of this dispute by distinguishing between being “legally 
innocent” and being “factually innocent,” where the latter status does not turn 
on what a trial court has decided.  Those who argue against appellate review of 
actual innocence cases often argue that it is inefficient or unfair to the families 
of victims not to allow finality in these emotionally charged cases where “legal 
innocence” has been disproved.  In what follows, we will be exclusively 
concerned with actual innocence cases concerning factual innocence.  We can 
then rephrase our question as follows: Should appellate courts seriously 
consider claims of “factual innocence?”  Our answer is yes. 
Part II of this article considers the case of Joseph Amrine, recently decided 
by the Missouri Supreme Court, to set the stage for the normative debate.  We 
then turn to four arguments advanced against having appellate courts seriously 
consider claims of actual innocence.  In Part III, we consider an argument from 
federalism that is mainly focused on denying federal courts appellate review of 
actual innocence claims.  In Part IV, we consider an argument based on finality 
and efficiency.  In Part V, we consider an argument based on procedural due 
process.  And in Part VI, we consider an argument grounded in considerations 
of deterrence.  In all four cases, the arguments are found wanting.  Part VII 
considers the core idea of substantive due process and argues that such an idea 
is indeed incompatible with executing the innocent.  We conclude by briefly 
presenting the beginnings of an argument about how to fix the system, perhaps 
by the creation of a special appellate court or permanent special master 
empowered to consider evidence of “actual innocence.” 
 
 3. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
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II.  THE JOSEPH AMRINE CASE 
On April 29, 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court decided the fate of Joseph 
Amrine, who claimed that he was entitled to state habeas relief concerning his 
conviction and death penalty sentence.  In Amrine v. Roper, the court was 
presented with the issue of “whether a Missouri prisoner sentenced to death 
[can] obtain habeas relief on a claim of actual innocence . . . independent of 
any constitutional violation.”4  The Missouri Supreme Court found that Amrine 
could obtain habeas relief from a judgment of conviction and sentence of death 
upon a clear and convincing showing of actual innocence.  The court ruled in 
Amrine’s favor, holding for the first time that “the continued imprisonment 
and eventual execution of an innocent person is a manifest injustice.”5 
In 1985, Amrine was charged with the murder of a fellow inmate in the 
Jefferson City Correctional Center.6  Officer John Noble identified Terry 
Russell as the perpetrator.7  When Russell was questioned about the murder, he 
claimed that Amrine had admitted to the stabbing.  Amrine was charged with 
the murder.8  Three inmates testified against Amrine, and the jury found 
Amrine guilty.9  In 1987, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction 
and sentence on direct appeal.10  Amrine filed for post-conviction relief, 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and new evidence of two witnesses 
recanting their trial testimony in which they had identified Amrine as the 
murderer.11  The motion court denied Amrine’s petition for relief, and the 
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the judgment without review of the 
recantations.12  Later, Amrine petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus to 
the United States District Court of the Western District of Missouri arguing 
that he was actually innocent given the recantations of two witnesses.13  The 
court rejected Amrine’s actual innocence claim despite the recantations of two 
witnesses, because of the continued existence of the incriminating testimony of 
a third witness, Jerry Poe.14 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 544. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 544. 
 9. Id. 
 10. State v. Amrine, 741 S.W.2d 665, 676 (Mo. 1987) (en banc). 
 11. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 544 (citing Amrine v. State, 785 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1990) (en 
banc)). 
 12. Id. (citing Amrine, 785 S.W.2d at 531). 
 13. Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1225–26 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 14. Id. (citing Amrine v. Bowersox, No. 90-0940, slip op. at 15–16 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 26, 
1996)). 
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Amrine obtained new counsel and located the third witness, who then 
completely recanted his trial testimony.15  With the new evidence, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a limited remand to the district court to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if the evidence was new and 
reliable, thus warranting habeas relief on the basis of Schlup v. Delo.16  On 
remand, the district court denied Amrine’s claim because only one witness’ 
testimony was new, and the recantation was deemed unreliable.17  The Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held “that evidence is new 
only if it was not available at trial.”18  The United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.19 
In 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court granted habeas relief to review all 
the evidence available concerning whether Amrine was actually innocent of 
the murder.20  In the first impression issue, the court cited Herrera v. Collins’ 
discussion of the viability of a freestanding claim of actual innocence.  While 
Herrera 
determined that federalism concerns militated against recognizing actual 
innocence as a basis for federal habeas relief, the Court assumed for the sake 
of argument that: “in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of actual 
innocence made after trial would render the execution of a defendant 
unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue 
open to process such a claim.”21 
The Missouri Supreme Court noted that, in Herrera, “six members of the 
Court suggested that there may be circumstances in which it would be 
constitutionally intolerable” to execute an innocent person.22  Further, the court 
cited Article 1, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution, which provides that 
“no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law.”23  This constitutional guarantee allowed the Missouri Supreme Court to 
“find as a matter of state law that, as the purpose of the criminal justice system 
is to convict the guilty and free the innocent, it is completely arbitrary to 
continue to incarcerate and eventually execute an individual who is actually 
innocent.”24  The court found that an execution would constitute a manifest 
injustice.25  The court concluded that it is crucial for state courts “to provide 
 
 15. Id. at 1226. 
 16. Id. at 1230 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)). 
 17. Amrine v. Bowersox, 238 F.3d 1023, 1028 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 18. Id. at 1029. 
 19. Amrine v. Luebbers, 534 U.S. 963 (2001). 
 20. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 21. Id. at 546 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993)). 
 22. Id. at 546 n.3. 
 23. Id. at 547 n.3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 543–44 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
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judicial recourse to an individual who . . . is able to produce sufficient evidence 
of innocence to undermine the habeas court’s confidence in the underlying 
judgment that resulted in defendant’s conviction and sentence of death.”26 
According to the Amrine court, “a freestanding claim of actual innocence 
is evaluated on the assumption that the trial was constitutionally adequate.”27  
The evidence must be “clear and convincing”28 and “strong enough to 
undermine the basis for the conviction so as to make the petitioner’s continued 
incarceration and eventual execution manifestly unjust even though the 
conviction was otherwise the product of a fair trial.”29 
The Missouri Supreme Court found that Amrine met his burden of clear 
and convincing evidence of actual innocence.30  The court ordered Amrine 
“conditionally discharged from . . . custody” in thirty days “unless the state 
elects to file new charges.”31  Amrine was eventually released from custody.32 
The dissents in Amrine did not disagree that Amrine’s claim of actual 
innocence should be heard but instead focused on the issue of credibility.  In 
his dissent, Judge Benton suggested that it is appropriate to appoint a special 
master to hold a hearing on the new evidence.33  Judge Benton’s main concern 
was that numerous appeals affirmed the conviction and the post-conviction 
hearings seemingly deemed the recantations not credible.34 
A freestanding claim of actual innocence arises when a convicted prisoner 
presents new evidence of innocence without a separate issue of a constitutional 
violation.  Historically, the federal writ of habeas corpus only addressed 
federal constitutional claims arising from state or federal courts.  The 
reluctance of many courts to hear freestanding claims of actual innocence 
stems from the United States Supreme Court decision in Herrera v. Collins.35  
There are four major arguments why federal, and many state courts, have 
limited the review of freestanding claims of actual innocence.  Issues of 
federalism, finality and cost, limited procedural due process, and deterrence all 
 
 26. Id. at 547. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 548.  “Evidence is clear and convincing when it ‘instantly tilts the scales in the 
affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition, and the fact finder’s mind is left 
with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.’”  Id. (quoting In re T.S., 925 S.W.2d 486, 
488 (Mo. Ct. App.  1996)). 
 29. Id. at 547.  See also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995); Simmons v. White, 866 
S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). 
 30. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 548. 
 31. Id. at 549. 
 32. Bill Bell Jr., Amrine is Freed from Jail After Years on Death Row: State Drops Its Case 
After Court Overturned Conviction Sentence; “I Missed So Much, It’s Just Too Much to Say,” 
SAINT LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 29, 2003, at B1. 
 33. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 550–51 (Benton, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting). 
 35. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
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have limited federal and state habeas corpus review of freestanding claims of 
innocence.  In the bulk of this article, we consider and reject each of these 
reasons.  We then turn to the chief positive reason in favor of exonerating those 
who are actually innocent, namely that to do otherwise is a violation of 
substantive due process.  We will sketch a view of substantive due process and 
then argue that this important goal is incompatible with executing the innocent. 
III.  FEDERALISM 
One commentator has summarized the trend in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings in the last generation: “Over the course of the following three 
decades the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have whittled away at the writ’s 
scope and availability.”36  Over this period, the Court has generally created 
more hurdles for state prisoners who seek federal habeas corpus relief.  One 
area where things may be changing concerns capital murder convictions, 
especially where new evidence surfaces after trial that casts doubt on the 
soundness of the original conviction and death sentence.  But even in this area, 
federal courts have been very reluctant to intervene because of federalism 
concerns, especially in criminal cases, which have historically been nearly the 
exclusive purview of state courts. 
The justifications for denying relief are many and include “concerns for the 
evisceration of comity and the lack of finality in state criminal convictions.”37  
“Advocates of curtailing or even abolishing federal habeas corpus relief for 
state prisoners have argued that the authority of a federal judge to overturn a 
state court decision tramples on fundamental principles of respect for local 
authority and finality.”38  The Herrera court held that federal habeas relief is 
only warranted when there is “no state avenue open to process such a claim.”39  
This requirement is consistent with goals of federalism and allows the states to 
have an active role in post-conviction processes.40  Federal courts cannot 
evaluate the merits of actual innocence claims as effectively as state courts, 
and allowing an independent review undermines the state’s interest in 
guaranteeing the accuracy of its own trial processes in guilty or innocent 
 
 36. Jake Sussman, Article, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an “Actual Innocence” 
Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 343, 378 
(2001–02). 
 37. Id. at 379. 
 38. Id. at 345 n.13 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)) (“Federal intrusions into 
state criminal trials frustrate both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-
faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.”). 
 39. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). 
 40. Michael J. Muskat, Note, Substantive Justice and State Interests in the Aftermath of 
Herrera v. Collins: Finding an Adequate Process for the Resolution of Bare Innocence Claims 
Through State Postconviction Remedies, 75 TEX. L. REV. 131, 148 (1996). 
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verdicts.41  Fact-finding is a process exclusively reserved to the states and 
“there is probably no greater cause of tension between the state and federal 
systems than to allow federal courts to conduct review of a state’s 
determination of guilt.”42 
In Herrera, Chief Justice Rehnquist “emphasized that the question of guilt 
or innocence is reserved . . . to the state courts, and before that question is 
ultimately decided, the State affords a criminal defendant a panoply of 
constitutional rights which ensure against” conviction of the innocent.43  
Furthermore, the Herrera ruling emphasized that states “‘have considerable 
expertise in matters of criminal procedure,’ and because ‘the criminal process 
is grounded in centuries of common-law tradition,’ the [Supreme] Court has 
traditionally exercised ‘substantial deference to [state] legislative judgments in 
[the criminal] area.’”44  The principle is also based on the well-grounded rule 
that federal habeas courts are to “ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in 
violation of the Constitution — not to correct errors of fact.”45 
Following Herrera, many federal circuit courts have rejected innocence 
claims of death row inmates who after trial discovered strong evidence of 
innocence.46  In Schlup v. Delo, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated 
its impatience with actual innocence claims of death row inmates, stating, 
“Federal habeas . . . does not provide a forum for the retrial of a convicted 
felon.”47  As seen in Herrera’s progeny, courts have followed Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion that the claim of innocence is not a constitutional issue.48  
The Supreme Court emphasized that “federal habeas courts sit . . . to ensure 
that the states preserve[] federal constitutional rights, ‘not to correct errors of 
fact,’ such as those involving guilt or innocence.”49  “[T]he majority stressed 
the ‘very disruptive effect’ that entertaining claims of actual innocence, 
unaccompanied by underlying constitutional claims, would have on the need 
for finality, as well as the overwhelming burden that having to retry cases, 
often based on stale evidence, would have on the states.”50 
 
 41. Id. at 164.  “The states’ sovereignty is affirmed through independent consideration of 
bare innocence claims because they have an overwhelming interest in maintaining the accuracy of 
their own trial processes and in assuring correct guilt or innocence determinations.”  Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims after Herrera 
v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 494 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398–99, 401 
(1993)). 
 44. Id. at 494 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407). 
 45. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400 (citing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87–88 (1923)). 
 46. See, e.g., Amrine v. Bowersox, 238 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 2001); Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 
738 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 47. Schlup, 11 F.3d at 741. 
 48. See Muskat, supra note 40, at 150–57. 
 49. Anderson, supra note 43, at 494 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400–01). 
 50. Id. at 495 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400–01). 
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State sovereignty involves significant interests in preserving the accuracy 
of a state’s own trial process and in ensuring the correct determination of guilt 
or innocence according to state law.51  Commentators have maintained that 
state, rather than federal, courts should review actual innocence claims.  The 
primary purpose of state trial courts is fact-finding on issues of guilt or 
innocence.  Vivian Berger “notes that federal courts have only limited 
expertise in the definition of state offenses and the application of state 
procedural and evidentiary law, making the evaluation of post-conviction 
challenges based on newly discovered evidence more difficult for the federal 
judiciary.”52 
We partially have sympathy for this set of arguments.  It is indeed difficult 
for federal courts to consider factual and legal issues that arise in the context of 
the criminal laws of a particular state.  But it is a serious deprivation of due 
process for the actually innocent to be executed.  If it is indeed quite 
significant, and if the particular state court is unwilling or barred from 
considering actual innocence claims, then should federalism prohibit such 
actual innocence claims from being considered by a federal district or circuit 
court of appeals?  In these limited circumstances, federal courts should 
seriously consider actual innocence claims so that the general fidelity and 
respect for law, which is clearly an important federal issue, is not undermined.  
Indeed, this is the result reached by the Herrera court.  However, the better 
strategy is to have actual innocence claims heard by state courts, rather than 
through federal oversight, given the hurdles that federalism poses to such 
federal oversight. 
IV.  FINALITY AND EXPENSE 
Finality has also been considered one of the standard principles that guide 
and shape habeas jurisprudence.  In Calderon v. Thompson, the Supreme Court 
emphasized “enduring respect for ‘[a] State’s interest in the finality of 
convictions that have survived direct review within the state court system.’”53  
Since Herrera, courts have continually debated arguments of finality and 
expense.  “Critics of state-prisoner access to federal habeas corpus relief argue 
that [allowing access] creates ‘an expensive, time-consuming, and redundant 
enterprise that frustrates law enforcement and needlessly injects the federal 
courts into matters better left to the states.’”54  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
 
 51. Muskat, supra note 40, at 164. 
 52. Anderson, supra note 43, at 499 (citing Vivian Berger, Herrera v Collins: The Gateway 
of Innocence for Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads to Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 
1009 (1994)). 
 53. 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)). 
 54. Sussman, supra note 36, at 345 n.13 (quoting Richard Faust et al., The Great Writ in 
Action: Empirical Light on the Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 637, 638 (1990–91)). 
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imposed many procedural obstacles for obtaining relief through the writ of 
habeas corpus and has justified these decisions in several ways.55 
The Supreme Court has enumerated finality, expense, and parameters of 
procedural due process as reasons for not allowing actual innocence claims to 
be heard by federal habeas courts.  State courts can provide efficient review of 
actual innocence claims by maintaining control over their criminal judgments 
via “case law, court rules, and statutes to ensure that their legal systems 
function as efficiently as possible so cases do eventually come to an end.”56  
Since Herrera, states bear most of the responsibility for providing post-
conviction review of actual innocence claims.  This responsibility was codified 
by the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), which “denies a federal habeas court jurisdiction in a capital case” 
if the convicted does not raise the claim first in state court.57 
Further, petitioners are afforded several state remedies, such as a motion 
for new trial, claims of direct appeal, or state clemency.  State habeas corpus 
relief can be the answer to post-conviction relief for bare innocence claims of 
state prisoners.  It is in the states’ best interest to provide their own post-
conviction procedures to review claims of innocence.  Since Herrera, several 
courts, such as the Amrine court, have offered additional rights under state 
constitutions to handle freestanding claims of actual innocence.58 
Due process requires weighing the values of finality, administrative 
convenience and the right not to be wrongly executed.  Further, perhaps one 
could argue that finality is so important because of the closure and satisfaction 
it gives to the families of the victims.  Inherent in our criminal justice system is 
the notion that when a fair trial has a legal finding of guilt, a victim’s family no 
longer has to worry or relive the crime.  The principle of finality may also be 
important because it “defines what is ‘enough’ procedure,” and this may 
“outweigh[] the importance of ensuring that an innocent person  not be 
executed.”59  Finality is needed not only for administrative concerns but also to 
 
 55. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA) requires petitioners to exhaust state remedies. There is a one-year period of limitation 
for application of writ of habeas corpus.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).  Furthermore, the 
AEDPA prohibits filing previously raised claims in second or successive federal habeas petitions 
unless the claim falls under Section 2244 (b), which includes an exception for petitioners who 
seek to file claims not previously raised if they can make a particular showing of innocence.  28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2000). 
 56. Anderson, supra note 43, at 500. 
 57. Id. at 498. 
 58. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); People v. 
Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996); Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 641 A.2d 1356 
(Conn. 1994). 
 59. Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44 
BUFF. L. REV. 501, 509 (1996). 
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bring about an end to an emotionally charged event that has affected the family 
and friends of the victim. 
Lurking behind all of this is the idea that it would somehow be unfair to 
require the federal or state courts to be open to the possibility of re-prosecuting 
someone who the state has already successfully prosecuted.  The principle of 
double jeopardy holds that it is patently unfair to re-prosecute a defendant for 
the same offense once a court has reached a determination of innocence.60  
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court seems to have articulated a similar 
principle for the state: It is patently unfair to make the federal or state courts 
re-prosecute for the same offense once a court has reached a determination of 
guilt.61  The problem is that the government, whether federal or state, is not in 
any particular jeopardy when a conviction is overturned in a manner similar to 
the way a defendant is in jeopardy of loss of liberty and life when an actual 
innocence claim is not considered.  While considerations of efficiency and 
finality are important, a basic sense of fairness seems to dictate that no stone be 
unturned in determining if a person about to be executed really did commit the 
crime for which he or she stands accused. 
V.  LIMITED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
Legally, a petitioner can never again be presumed innocent once he or she 
has been convicted.  Once the defendant is afforded a fair trial and convicted, 
the “presumption of innocence disappears” and the state has accomplished its 
goal of converting that individual from one “presumed innocent to one found 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”62  According to Herrera, the question of 
judicial review of an actual innocence claim should be “analyzed only in terms 
of procedural due process.”63  Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that: “[t]he 
question before us . . . is not whether due process prohibits the execution of an 
innocent person, but rather whether it entitles petitioner to judicial review of 
his ‘actual innocence’ claim.”64  The question of whether substantive due 
process prohibits the execution of an innocent person was never addressed in 
Herrera. 
Rehnquist observed that “the trial is the paramount event for determining 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant.”65  Additionally, “there is no 
established constitutional right to direct appeal from a conviction.”66  
 
 60. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978). 
 61. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711, 717 (1969)). 
 62. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 
(1974)). 
 63. Id. at 408 n.6. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 418. 
 66. Bandes, supra note 59, at 507. 
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Therefore, “Rehnquist’s argument appears to be that the petitioner has received 
all the process that he is due” and, hence, Herrera never reached the issue of 
“substantive entitlement to life.”67  Furthermore, Justice Scalia’s concurrence, 
joined by Justice Thomas, states, “There is no basis in text, tradition, or even 
contemporary practice (if that were enough), for finding in the Constitution a 
right to demand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of 
innocence brought forward after conviction.”68  Post-Herrera, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “[I]t is lawful under the Due Process Clause to 
end the judicial review process at some point, despite the purely theoretical 
possibility that the defendant might have been able to demonstrate his 
innocence in the future.”69 
The argument concerning procedural due process has many aspects.  One 
of the most important is that the presumption of innocence is extinguished 
once there has been a conviction based on a procedurally fair trial and that in 
its place is a presumption of guilt.  In response, we wish to draw on the 
distinction between “legal innocence” and “factual innocence” which we 
developed earlier in our article.  It may be that the presumption in favor of 
innocence has indeed been rebutted once a judgment has been reached at the 
end of a trial.  Why, however, think that this requires a presumption in favor of 
guilt rather than no presumption on either side?  And, in the kind of cases we 
are considering, why not assume the possibility that new post-trial evidence 
might call into question the soundness of the judgment reached on the basis of 
the facts known at the time of trial but now found to be incomplete? 
VI.  DETERRENCE 
“The Court has often emphasized that finality is integral to both the 
retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law, and serves to maintain 
the federal balance.”70  Regarding deterrence, lack of finality could breed a 
lack of concern that executions will ever happen, thus nullifying the positive 
deterrence value of the threat of execution in capital cases.  Retribution is even 
more likely to be potentially stymied since the person who has already been 
determined to be guilty will not get what he or she deserves if the trial court’s 
judgment is not upheld. 
Deterrence is based on the idea that rational individuals will make 
decisions that maximize their overall well-being.  “The deterrence theory 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Tara L. Swafford, Note, Responding to Herrera v. Collins: Ensuring that Innocents are 
not Executed, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603, 612 (1995) (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427–28 
(Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 69. United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 68 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 70. Anderson, supra note 43, at 496 (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 
(1998)). 
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assumes that a rational person will avoid criminal behavior if the severity of 
the punishment for that behavior and the perceived certainty of receiving the 
punishment combine to outweigh the benefits of the illegal conduct.”71  Of 
course there are well-known problems with such a view, not the least of which 
is the often unwarranted assumption that a person will indeed act rationally.72  
In addition, people who are rational often lack the ability or will to calculate 
effectively, especially when placed into highly stressful situations.73  
Nonetheless, the general idea is hard to dispute.  People will be dissuaded from 
doing something that they want to do if taking action is highly likely to 
produce additional consequences that are more undesirable than the positive 
consequences they desire by performing the conduct. 
When a judicial system allows for seemingly endless appeals of death 
penalty sentences, the deterrent effect of capital punishment is adversely 
affected because the “certainty” of receiving the horrible punishment is 
thought to diminish.74  Indeed, as the number of bases for appeal increases, the 
perception that death is not at all certain if one commits capital murder also 
seems to increase.75  This also affects the issue of severity because a highly 
certain sentence of life without parole may be seen as more severe than a less-
certain death sentence.  If the death penalty is to be reserved for those cases 
where deterrence is most needed, there is some reason to think that any 
weakening of the death penalty’s deterrence should be avoided. 
Such arguments need not deter us from our main goal because the cases 
that we are considering in this article are cases of actual innocence.  If a person 
has not committed the proscribed act, it is hardly an argument against releasing 
him that he is not sufficiently deterred from doing that act again.  In addition, 
the main argument against the deterrence theory is that there is a similarly 
important countervailing idea, namely one concerned with manifest injustice 
based on denial of substantive due process.  If we are willing to protect the 
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 73. Id. at 143 (noting that scholars have observed “that real people often behave irrationally 
in that they are prone to become emotional, they accede to costly social norms, and they both 
make logical errs and base decisions on false (or incomplete) premises.”). 
 74. For a critique of studies of perceptual deterrence, see Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, 
The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisted, 27 
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innocent by setting the standard of proof in criminal cases so high as to risk 
letting the guilty go free, surely we should also be willing to risk diminishing 
the deterrent effect of capital punishment to make sure that the innocent are not 
executed.  In the end, deterrence must be seen as just one of the many goals of 
criminal law.  To hold otherwise is to abandon our long cherished principles of 
humane treatment of prisoners.76 
VII.  SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
It is commonplace to distinguish procedural from substantive due process, 
but it is sometimes not so easy to provide a conceptual basis for distinguishing 
these categories of due process.  One could maintain that procedural due 
process concerns only whether existing rules were followed, whereas 
substantive due process concerns whether a correct result was reached.  
Substantive due process is meant to guarantee that judicial decisions conform 
to standards of justice (commonly called natural justice) so that punishment be 
awarded only where it is due.77  The idea of substantive justice can historically 
be traced back to the idea of equity that not only allowed for gaps in the law to 
be filled but also for black letter law to be overruled when fundamental 
fairness would be infringed.78 
Paul M. Bator expresses the idea behind procedural due process by arguing 
that it should be thought of: 
in terms of the conservation of resources — and I mean not only simple 
economic resources, but all of the intellectual, moral, and political resources 
involved in the legal system.  The presumption must be, it seems to me, that if 
a job can be well done once, it should not be done twice.79 
The idea behind procedural due process is that if a fair set of rules have been 
followed once, then justice has been done.  It does not matter what result was 
reached by following those rules.  Substantive due process, on the other hand, 
is result oriented.  Fair rules can be followed and yet a morally or politically 
unjust result can be reached. 
The Supreme Court has found that substantive due process prohibits 
conduct by the government that interferes with fundamental rights or “shocks 
the conscience.”80  Some commentators have distinguished between two 
 
 76. For example, if the only goal were deterrence, the less human treatment of prisoners 
would probably increase the deterrent effect as well.  Thus, deterrence is only one goal of 
criminal law and cannot justify all means to the end. 
 77. See generally LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1969). 
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(2005). 
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branches of substantive due process.  Peter Rubin has recently expressed the 
distinction in the following way: 
[A governmental action] can be arbitrary in the sense that is irrational and 
cannot be justified; such action is prohibited by the substantive due process 
rational basis test.  And it can be arbitrary in the sense that it is brutal or 
despotic; this is action that is prohibited by the “shocks the conscience” or 
“arbitrary in the constitutional sense” test.81 
The “fundamental liberty interest” branch of substantive due process has been 
acknowledged in a recent Supreme Court decision.  In 1997, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated in Washington v. Glucksberg: 
The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the “liberty” it 
protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint . . . [I]n addition 
to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the “liberty . . . 
includes the rights to marry, to have children, to bodily integrity, and to 
abortion.82 
In the case of actual innocence, the fundamental right to live is a “liberty” 
that should be protected, which, if not protected, would constitute arbitrary 
treatment by the government.  The “rights” or “liberties” of substantive due 
process have been defined by the Court as protected liberty interests and 
fundamental rights that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and “so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.”83  Certainly the preservation of life is a constitutional guarantee 
under substantive due process that should override any argument that the 
procedural aspects of the trial were constitutional.  This is why the Amrine 
decision was correct in recognizing the “manifest injustice” of execution or 
continued incarceration of an innocent person regardless of whether there was 
a procedurally “fair” trial.84 
Considerations of substantive due process, or considerations of “manifest 
injustice,” are often controversial but can be defended normatively.  Lon Fuller 
has said that there are basic principles of natural justice that must be adhered to 
in order to subscribe to the rule of law.85  While most of these considerations 
are procedural, such as the prohibitions against ex post facto proceedings or 
secret witnesses, there are a few substantive principles that the courts have 
discussed under the label of fundamental principles of ordered liberty.  For 
example, while there may be a procedurally fair system of slavery, it seems 
uncontroversial that such a system would violate substantive standards of 
justice.  Again, while acknowledging that some of the principles of substantive 
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due process are controversial, it would seem to us that the main consideration 
is that liberty, and certainly life, should not be taken by the state unless it is 
deserved.  This is wholly consistent with principles of retribution, which are 
also ultimately grounded in what people deserve for the actions that they have 
taken. 
Perhaps we can gain insight by looking at what is called manifest injustice 
in international criminal law.  When interpreting the superior orders defense, it 
is claimed that no reasonable person could think that it is right to do what one 
was ordered to do if it involved manifest illegality.86  The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, for example, categorizes crimes against humanity 
and genocide as “manifestly unlawful” for the purpose of superior orders.87  
Similarly, it could be said that it is manifestly unjust for an innocent person to 
be executed even if the execution was based on a procedurally fair trial.  
Courts should be able to see that, as in the case of slavery, procedural due 
process is not determinative of ultimate fairness.  In the international criminal 
law case, the fact that a superior order has been given should not count as a 
justification for genocidal killing.  Similarly, in the capital murder context, the 
fact that a trial court has reached a procedurally fair determination of guilt does 
not count as a justification for executing the innocent.  The idea is that certain 
results are so clearly and patently wrong (morally or politically) that they 
cannot stand.88 
The purpose behind the high standard of proof in criminal cases is to try to 
make sure that the innocent are not convicted, even at the cost of letting many 
of the guilty go free.  Indeed, it is hard to find a better example of manifest 
injustice or a violation of substantive due process than executing the innocent.  
This is the holding of the Missouri Supreme Court in the Amrine opinion.89  
Even if the trial was procedurally correct, it would still violate our implicit 
understanding of due process if adhering to the verdict would allow an 
innocent person to be executed.  Hence, it is hard to fathom why some 
commentators have argued against the right to even have a hearing on actual 
innocence claims, let alone to be exonerated on the basis of demonstrating 
one’s actual innocence. 
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VIII.  A FEW PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS 
In this final part we briefly propose one possible way to resolve this 
problem, namely through the creation of a special state appellate court or 
permanent special master authorized to hear “new” facts that are discovered 
after the initial trial.  Here we follow the sage advice provided by most of the 
judges on the Missouri Supreme Court in Amrine.  Three dissenting judges 
argued for a special master or other basis for determining if the new evidence 
was indeed reliable and dispositive.90  One of the concurring judges called for 
a new trial.91  The majority held that the prosecutor could proceed to a new 
trial, but if that option was not pursued, that Amrine should be released due to 
the weakness of the remaining evidence.92 
In his concurring opinion in Amrine, Judge Wolff recognized that both the 
majority opinion and dissents found “that the state court’s writ of habeas 
corpus is the appropriate remedy in cases of actual innocence.”93  In the 
dissent, Judge Price concurs with Judge Benton and would refer this case to a 
special “master for a hearing to determine, as a matter of fact and in light of all 
of the evidence, whether Mr. Amrine is actually innocent and, accordingly, 
whether he is entitled to relief from his conviction under habeas corpus.”94  As 
in Amrine, if credibility is the key to a case claiming “actual innocence,” a 
separate hearing would correctly evaluate all the evidence.  Another alternative 
is a new trial, although this has serious drawbacks if the case is old and the 
original witnesses are now hard to locate. Merely sending the case back to the 
original trial court for rehearing also poses problems because trial court judges 
are often reluctant to reverse themselves.  If there were a specific appellate 
court or special master that could provide a hearing to consider the reliability 
of new evidence, the Missouri Supreme Court would not have had to assess the 
evidence on its own or remand the matter back to the original trial court. 
It could be argued that adding a new appellate court or even a permanent 
special master would add new costs to a judicial system already hard-pressed 
for funds to support its existing institutions. We recognize this problem and yet 
think that the price of justice must often be paid, especially when we are 
dealing with cases in which death is involved.  In addition, calling for a 
complete retrial is an extremely inefficient way to determine the reliability of 
one or two new pieces of evidence.  A new state appellate court or a permanent 
special master should be empowered to provide an evidentiary hearing on the 
reliability of newly discovered evidence. 
 
 90. Id. at 550–52 (Benton, J., dissenting) (Price, J., dissenting). 
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As the Missouri Supreme Court recognized, it seems clear from the 
arguments considered that state appellate courts should hear habeas petitions 
alleging actual innocence.  Habeas corpus petitions were first designed to give 
prisoners an avenue to prove that they were being unjustly incarcerated and 
punished.  If claims of actual innocence, especially in capital cases, are not 
claims that fall under habeas review, it is unclear what complaints would ever 
properly fall under habeas review.  Contrary to what the assistant attorney 
general argued in the Amrine case, and consistent with a long line of theorists 
who have considered this issue, everything possible should be done to make 
sure that the state does not execute the innocent. 
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